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The "Branding Effect" of Contracts
D. Gordon Smitht
Why do people create contracts? Mark Suchman suggests that
contracts have both technical and symbolic properties.' On the tech-
nical side, "contracts establish intricate frameworks of procedures,
commitments, rights, and incentives - all in order to accomplish prac-
tical objectives in the governance of human transactions."2 Of course,
contracting parties often deviate from the terms prescribed in con-
tract documents without ending up in court.3 Thus, Ian Macneil has
asserted that people make contracts "[flor exactly the same reason
people make architectural drawings for a building which are likely
never to be used because making them is part of the process of get-
ting the final plans and finally building the building."4
Macneil's conception of the role of contracts hints at the possibil-
ity of symbolic properties in contracts. Suchman embraces that possi-
bility, arguing that "contracts evoke normative principles and
illuminate social experiences - at times expressing identity, solidar-
ity, forbearance, and faith, and at times expressing differentiation,
inequality, domination, and distrust."5 In his case study of the Mas-
terCard IP0 6 and its predecessor piece on the Google IPO, 7 Victor
Fleischer describes one possible symbolic manifestation of contracts:
the "branding effect" of legal infrastructure. The purpose of this essay
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Thanks to Guhan Sub-
ramanian, Michael Simkovic, and Crystal Blum for organizing this conference, to Vic
Fleischer for inviting me to comment on his work, and to Darian Ibrahim for inviting
me to present this paper at a workshop for the faculty of the University of Arizona
James E. Rogers College of Law.
1. Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 91,
91 (2003).
2. Id. at 99.
3. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
4. Franklin G. Snyder et al., Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 691 (2005).
5. Suchman, supra note 1, at 100.
6. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 137 (2006).
7. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) [hereinafter Fleischer, Brand New Deal].
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is to examine this purported branding effect and suggest possible re-
finements to the concept. A more informed evaluation of the preva-
lence and importance of branding effects awaits further empirical
study.
Legal scholars have studied contractual relationships for de-
cades,8 and articles on "relational contracts" continue to appear regu-
larly in law reviews.9 The overwhelming majority of legal scholars
who write about contractual relationships, however, strive to evalu-
ate or advance contract doctrine.10 Other scholars, taking their cue
from the seminal work of Stewart Macaulay, 1 have focused on the
management of contractual relationships.1 2
8. For foundational work in this area, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Macaulay, supra note
3; Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465; Ian R.
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). Of course, one
can trace the idea of relational contracts even further back. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn,
What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
9. See, e.g., Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, The Doctrine of Impractica-
bility, and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 227
(2004); William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism, 2004 Wis.
L. REV. 631 (2004).
10. Papers published in the Northwestern University Law Review in connection
with the excellent symposium entitled "Relational Contracting Theory: Unanswered
Questions" reveal the dedicated interest in legal doctrine among those who write
about relational contracts. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in
Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 737 (2000) ("I want to situate Macneil's relational
contract theory within the story of the development of contract law"); Eric Posner, A
Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 749, 751 (2000) ("If Macneil is right, and courts cannot resolve contractual dis-
putes by discovering initial contractual intentions on the basis of documents and
other evidence, cannot use such intentions (even if they exist) to guide behavior late
in the life of a relational contract, cannot enforce contracts in a way that maximizes
their value ex ante, cannot fill in gaps by imagining the hypothetical bargain - then
what should the courts do?"); Robert E. Scott, A Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 847 (2000) ("the central task in developing a plausi-
ble normative theory of contract law is to specify the appropriate role of the state in
regulating incomplete contracts"); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Chal-
lenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 838 (2000) ("a continuing chal-
lenge is for courts to recognize the special characteristics of relational contracts and to
develop a set of default rules that are more responsive to the problems that those
characteristics generate").
11. See Macaulay, supra note 3, at 55.
12. The best-known recent work in this genre belongs to Lisa Bernstein. See Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1746-88 (2001); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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The study of contractual relationships could have taken a differ-
ent path in the legal academy. Instead of focusing on contract doc-
trine or relationship management, legal scholars could have elected
to study contract documents. For the better part of the last three de-
cades, however, such studies have been performed primarily by econ-
omists 13 and a smattering of others 14 who work outside of the legal
academy. As a result, those who draft and interpret contracts profes-
sionally have not contributed substantially to our understanding of
contractual structures. 15
Economists often frame the discussion of contract documents
around the concept of opportunism, which Oliver Williamson defines
as "a condition of self-interest seeking with guile."' 6 Under this view,
the potential for opportunism arises because contracting parties are
constrained by bounded rationality - the notion that, try as they
13. Much of the work here emanates from Oliver Williamson's and Benjamin
Klein's work on "transaction cost economics." See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transac-
tions Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233
(1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1983); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments:
Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1983); Benjamin
Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants
of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AiY. ECON. REV. 356 (1980).
14. For work in sociology, see Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Le-
gal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 479 (1997); Lauren B.
Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environment of Entrepreneurship, in THE
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DYNAMIC (Claudia Bird Schoonhoven & Elaine Romanelli eds.,
2001); Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital
Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
15. The notable exception is Henry Hansmann. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWN-
ERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996). For other recent examples, see D. Gordon Smith, The
Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315 (2005); D. Gordon Smith, The
Exit Structure of Strategic Alliances, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 303 (2005); Robert Daines,
The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Robert
Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover
Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54
STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
16. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 30 (1998). He also observed:
I do not insist that every individual is continuously or even largely given to
opportunism. To the contrary, I merely assume that some individuals are
opportunistic some of the time and that differential trustworthiness is rarely
transparent ex ante. As a consequence, ex ante screening efforts are made
and ex post safeguards are created. Otherwise, those who are least principled
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might, people cannot foresee all future contingencies. 17 Bounded ra-
tionality precludes the possibility of drafting complete contracts.
When one of the contracting parties invests in an asset that cannot
move from one use to another without losing productive value (what
Williamson calls asset specificity18 ), the other contracting party can
engage in "holdup."19
Holdup occurs when one contracting party threatens another
with economic harm unless concessions are granted by the
threatened party.20 Holdup is, essentially, opportunism realized. The
power of holdup exists only within contractual relationships, not in
initial contract negotiations, and results from the investment of rela-
tionship-specific assets by one of the parties. Anticipation of holdup is
said to motivate the structure of contractual relationships. In partic-
ular, the potential for holdup encourages contracting parties to enter
into long-term relationships or to vertically integrate.
17. Actually, bounded rationality is more complex than being limited in cognitive
competence. It might also include an inability to negotiate future plans because par-
ties "have to find a common language to describe states of the world and actions with
respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide." OLIVER HART,
FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995). Finally, bounded rationality
might include an inability to write contracts in such a way that they can be enforced
by a third party. Id.
18. WILLIAMSON, supra note 16, at 54.
19. The literature on holdups is voluminous, and much of it revolves around the
much-debated case of Fisher Body and General Motors, first discussed in Benjamin
Klein et al., supra note 13, at 308-10. The subsequent debate over Fisher Body has
been spirited. See Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors,
43 J.L. & ECON. 15 (2000) (no evidence of holdup in relationship between GM and
Fisher Body); Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration:
Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000) (no evidence of holdup in the rela-
tionship between GM and Fisher Body until after the acquisition); Ramon Casadesus-
Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000)
(merger of GM and Fisher Body was not motivated by a desire to avoid holdup); and
Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON.
105 (2000) (evidence of holdup in relationship between GM and Fisher Body exists
and fear of holdup motivated the acquisition). The latest contribution by Ronald
Coase to that debate has descended into allegations of professional misconduct. Ron-
ald Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Mo-
tors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 255, 255 (2006) (wondering"... what it is about
the conduct of economics that led so many able economists to choose error rather than
truth").
20. The term "holdup" is sometimes used synonymously with "opportunism."
Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Research and Development Alliances: Evidence From a
Federal Contracts Repository, 47 J.L. ECON. 123, 127 (2004). Masten et al. suggest the
possibility of holdup in the absence of asset specificity. They use the term "temporal
specificity" to describe a situation in which "timely performance is critical, [and] delay
becomes a potentially effective strategy for exacting price concessions." Scott E. Mas-
ten et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 9 (1991).
The "Branding Effect" of Contracts
Victor Fleischer is after something completely different from
transaction cost economization. 21 The branding effect is not aimed at
reducing the potential for opportunism by a counterparty to a con-
tract, but rather at increasing the attractiveness of a product to pre-
sent and future users, or at improving the image of a company in the
eyes of regulators, judges, and juries.
Fleischer's work on the branding effect in contracts fits neatly
into a scholarly framework proposed by Mark Suchman, who has ar-
gued for a "serious scholarly consideration of contracts as things, that
is, for the analysis of contract documents as social artifacts."22 The
purpose of approaching contracts as social artifacts is to reveal more
about the contracting parties by invoking a broader set of questions
than those normally addressed through transaction cost economics. 23
As noted above, Suchman suggests that contracts have both technical
and symbolic properties, and Fleischer's "branding effect" may be one
of those symbolic properties.
21. In Brand New Deal, Fleischer describes the objects of his studies as "deal
structures." He mentions relational contracts only in passing, Fleischer, Brand New
Deal, supra note 6, at 1589, though his description of the deal structures reveals that
he is focusing on contractual terms. For example, in his study of the MasterCard IPO,
Fleischer examines a "reverse" dual-class voting structure and the creation of a chari-
table foundation. See Fleischer, supra note 6, at 149-54. Whether all deal structures
are "relational" in a Williamsonian sense is a thornier question. Fleischer connects
deal structures to transaction cost analysis, see id. at 137 n.1 ("Deal structures are
generally driven by a desire to manage transaction costs."), but transaction costs exist
in all contracting environments, and some of the deal features cited by Fleischer - for
example, Google's use of the "Dutch auction" format for its initial public offering and
Ben & Jerry's decision to sell stock only to Vermont residents - are relevant primarily
to the sale transaction rather than to the management of the ongoing relationship.
The issue is further muddied by the propensity of law professors to refer to all
contracts as relational. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Rela-
tional Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 852 (2000) ("All contracts are relational, com-
plex and subjective."). Ian Macneil has stated, "I start from the proposition that all
contracts of every kind, are relational, and they all occur in relations. Even the most
truncated ones you can think of occur within relations." Symposium: The Common
Law of Contracts as a World Force in Two Ages of Revolution: A Conference Celebrat-
ing the 150th Anniversary of Hadley v. Baxendale, Relational Contracting in a Digital
Age, 11 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 679 (2005). Though I have situated my analysis
within the relational contracting literature because I am interested in the study of
contract documents, and economic studies focus overwhelmingly on long-term con-
tractual relationships, "branding effects" do not seem uniquely relevant to contracts
on the relational end of the relational-discrete continuum.
22. Suchman, supra note 1, at 92.
23. Suchman defines "artifact" as a "discrete material object, consciously pro-
duced or transformed by human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or
cultural environment." Id. at 98. Artifacts are not speech, gestures, or merely ideas.
They are "concrete bits of 'material culture,' and they merit study because of what
they reveal about the lives and times of their makers and users." Id.
Winter 20071
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In his case study of MasterCard, Fleischer examines the brand-
ing effect of MasterCard's use of a charitable foundation as a sub-
stantial post-IPO shareholder. 24 Fleischer claims that MasterCard
has positioned itself as a "financial services company that supports
family values and understands the limits of consumerism" 25 and as a
brand that consumers associate with safety and security.26 These
messages embedded in MasterCard's brand are aimed at present and
future users of MasterCard's services and possibly at regulators,
judges, and juries. While branding may play an important role in ad-
dressing information asymmetries between a company and its cus-
tomers, thus reducing the potential for opportunism,2 7 this signaling
function (discussed further below) is distinct from the pure transac-
tion cost economization described above. Under Williamson's frame-
work, transaction cost economization occurs within the contractual
relationship, whereas the "branding effect" is a positive externality of
that relationship.
The MasterCard foundation would fit neatly into Fleischer's ac-
count of a branding effect if the charitable donations were targeted to
a cause that fit MasterCard's brand image. In this instance, however,
the Foundation exists to support "programs and initiatives that help
children and youth access education, understand and utilize technol-
ogy and develop the skills necessary to succeed in a diverse and
global workforce"28 and "organizations that provide microfinance pro-
grams and services to financially disadvantaged persons and commu-
nities in order to enhance local economies and develop
entrepreneurs."29 According to Fleischer, these causes blur the
branding story:
Here, the branding potential is powerful - $600 million is a
lot of money to give away - but the fit is unclear. MasterCard's
stated purposes related to education and microfinance. The
strongest case to be made is that the MasterCard brand image
includes access to the upper middle class lifestyle. Education
24. The foundation holds about 17% of the voting shares of MasterCard. This
stake represents a claim to 10% of the financial rights in the company and is worth
approximately $600 million.
25. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 141.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Soo Jiuan Tan, Strategies For Reducing Consumers' Risk Aversion in
Internet Shopping, 16 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 163, 166 (1999) (using experimental
methods to demonstrate that "a well-established brand name is more effective than a
new brand in reducing the risk perception of consumers in Internet shopping").
28. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 152.
29. Id.
The "Branding Effect" of Contracts
and microfinance are both associated with upward class mobil-
ity. By giving money to such causes, MasterCard can enhance
its brand image as a facilitator of the Priceless lifestyle. And it
may create a few more MasterCard customers to boot. By shack-
ling the foundation's ability to give for four years, however, the
brand impact is muted. To the extent the public notices the
foundation at all, they may notice it for the corporate govern-
ance gimmick that it is rather than the social institution that it
may become. 30
The weakness of the branding story in this instance raises an
obvious question: is it really a branding story at all? The primary
obstacle to answering this question is that Fleischer's notion of
branding effect needs more development. What follows are some
thoughts on how one might refine the theory of branding effects.
First, branding may be a form of signaling, but the branding ef-
fect identified by Fleischer also has a function unrelated to signaling,
and it is this distinctive function that is most interesting with regard
to the future study of contract documents. In the economic literature,
contracting parties use signals to mitigate information asymme-
tries.3 1 For example, prior to investing in a startup technology com-
pany, venture capitalists might want to know whether the company
has good management, a culture of innovation, and a viable market
niche. Gathering and measuring information to make these analyses
may be impossible or, at least, very expensive. As a result, venture
capitalists rely on signals, such as patent applications, as external
indicators of these positive attributes.3 2 Patent applications convey
some information directly (e.g., the nature of the invention), but the
signaling function of patent applications flows from the indirect
transmission of information (e.g., regarding firm productivity or inno-
vative activity).33
30. Id. at 152-53.
31. For the seminal work on signaling, see A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNAL-
ING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES (1974);
A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973). Parallel works
by evolutionary biologists deal with similar issues. See, e.g., Richard Dawkins & John
R. Krebs, Animal Signals: Information or Manipulation?, in BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY:
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 282 (John R. Krebs & Nicholas B. Davies eds., 1978).
32. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1505-06 (2001) ("Venture capitalists use client patents (or more likely, pat-
ent applications) as evidence that the company is well managed, is at a certain stage
in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche.").
33. For an extensive discussion of the information conveyed by patents, see
Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 646-55 (2002).
Winter 20071
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Branding may perform a similar function between companies
and consumers or investors by conveying information about firm or
product quality that would otherwise be difficult to discover, produce,
or transmit. Fleischer acknowledges the possibility that a deal struc-
ture might serve as a "reputational bonding mechanism,"34 which is a
conventional economic term that approximates "branding."35 On the
other hand, Fleischer contends that "deal structure is an effective ad-
vertising medium when it reaches early adopters and opinion lead-
ers: sophisticated, knowledgeable consumers who start trends."36
Though Fleischer refers to this form of advertising as "consumer sig-
naling," it is not signaling in the conventional economic sense be-
cause it is not aimed at mitigating information asymmetries. 37 The
possibility that deal structures have a marketing component is the
most innovative and intriguing aspect of Fleischer's work.38
This marketing component of deal structures is not focused
on the transmission of information, but instead on the creation of
meaning.39 Thus, commentators often describe branding through
34. Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 7, at 1629.
35. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
36. Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 7, at 1629.
37. In addition, the messages described by Fleischer may not be costly to pro-
duce. Id. When messages are inexpensive to produce, they can be replicated by dis-
honest imitators, thus undermining their usefulness as signals. They are, in the
jargon of economics, "cheap talk." David M. Kreps & Joel Sobel, Signalling, in HAND-
BOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, VOL. 2, 850, 863-65 (Robert J.
Aumann & Sergiu Hart eds., 1994).
38. The following discussion of branding is general, and, among other omissions,
it does not account for possible differences in brands. See, e.g., Alice M. Tybout &
Gregory S. Carpenter, Creating and Managing Brands, in KELLOGG ON MARKETING
74, 80-100 (Dawn lacobucci ed., 2001) (identifying three types of brands - functional,
image, and experiential - each of which might be employed in one of three branding
strategies - corporate, family, and product).
39. See Bobby J. Calder & Steven J. Reagan, Brand Design, in KELLOGG ON MAR-
KETING, supra note 38, at 58 ("To market, we have to go beyond the product. We must
transcend whatever the product is as a physical or objective entity. We must create
and convey the meaning of the product."). The meaning of a brand is separate from
the markers of that brand. Douglas Holt illustrates the distinction as follows:
Consider a new product that a company has just introduced. Although the
product has a name, a trademarked logo, unique packaging, and perhaps
other unique design features - all aspects that we intuitively think of as the
brand - the brand does not yet truly exist. Names, logos, and design are the
material markers of the brand. Because the product does not yet have a his-
tory, however, these markers are empty. They are devoid of meaning. Now,
think of famous brands. They have markers, also: a name (McDonald's, IBM),
a logo (the Nike swoosh, the Travelers umbrella), a distinctive design feature
(Harley's engine sound), or any other design element that is uniquely associ-
ated with the product. The difference is that these markets have been filled
196
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references to emotional40 - or even religious41 - concepts. Brand
meanings are created through stories,4 2 and these stories have many
authors. 43 Fleischer adds "deal structures" to the list of stories that
contribute to a brand's identity.
Second, the "branding effect" is pervasive, just as brands them-
selves are pervasive. 44 Though Fleischer disclaims the notion that
"every deal has important branding implications,"45 it is not hard to
imagine that many of the deals that fall within Fleischer's contem-
plation - including "IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, securities offer-
ings, executive-compensation arrangements, and other matters of
with customer experiences. Advertisements, films, and sporting events use
the brand as a prop. Magazines and newspaper articles evaluate the brand,
and people talk about the brand in conversation. Over time, ideas about the
product accumulate and fill the brand markers with meaning. A brand is
formed.
DOUGLAS B. HOLT, How BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRAND-
ING 2-3 (2004).
40. See, e.g., JAMES B. TWITCHELL, BRANDED NATION: THE MARKETING OF
MEGACHURCH, COLLEGE, INC., AND MUSEUMWORLD 12 (2004) ("The taste of Evian is
not on the palate but in the imagination"); ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK,
WHY THEY Buy: AMERICAN CONSUMERS INSIDE AND OUT 107 (1986) ("By pairing the
brand name of the product with stimuli that naturally elicit positive emotional re-
sponses from people, over many repetitions, consumers learn to associate the brand
with positive emotions. When they think of the brand they'll have good feelings about
it.").
41. PATRICK HANLON, PRIMAL BRANDING: CREATE ZEALOTS FOR YOUR BRAND,
YOUR COMPANY, AND YOUR FUTURE 6-7 (2006) ("Brands are belief systems... Believ-
ing is belonging."); MARTIN LINDSTROM, BRAND SENSE: BUILD POWERFUL BRANDS
THROUGH TOUCH, TASTE, SMELL, SIGHT, AND SOUND 175-92 (2005) (describing ten
rules for "tak[ing] a brand beyond its traditional loyal base of consumers toward a
bonding that resembles a religious relationship").
42. See SETH GODIN, ALL MARKETERS ARE LIARS: THE POWER OF TELLING AUTHEN-
TIC STORIES IN A Low-TRUST WORLD (2005). Godin explains the importance of story-
telling, in part, by appealing to the same reasoning that underlies the use of signals:
"Stories are shortcuts we use because we're too overwhelmed by data to discover all
the details." Id. at 2. Ultimately, however, Godin's message is that stories convey
meaning rather than information. See id. at 8 ("A great story is true. Not true because
it's factual, but true because it's consistent and authentic.").
43. HOLT, supra note 39, at 3 ("A brand emerges as various 'authors' tell stories
that involve the brand. Four primary types of authors are involved: companies, the
culture industries, intermediaries (such as critics and retail salespeople), and custom-
ers (particularly when they form communities).").
44. Patrick Hanlon defines "brand" as "any product, service, personality, organi-
zation, social cause, political ideology, religion, movement, or other entity searching
for popular appeal." HANLON, supra note 41, at 6-7. See also Tybout & Carpenter,
supra note 38, at 74 ("Brands are one of the most universal aspects of modern mar-
kets. Nearly every company, whether or not it competes in consumer markets, has a
brand - an identity, a name, a reputation.").
45. See Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 7, at 1586.
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internal corporate governance"46 - contribute to the formation of a
brand. As noted above, brands are shaped by stories, and many of
these transactions are stories. For example, if using a Dutch auction
for its initial public offering marks Google as "innovative, egalitarian,
playful, [and] trustworthy,"47 using a firm-commitment offering may
support the image of another company as staid, traditional, elitist, or
sneaky.48
Third, the branding effect is only one form of symbolic communi-
cation used in contracts. Mark Suchman suggests other possibilities.
For example, contracts might be "sacred symbol[s that] . . . link the
lived-reality of individual transactions to broader cultural belief sys-
tems . . .,,49 Suchman also asserts that some contract structures be-
come "ideograms, representing concepts and postures that the parties
cannot or will not explicitly verbalize." 50
Fourth, the branding effect may sometimes coincide with trans-
action cost stories. For example, one might argue that Google's use of
the Dutch auction was an attempt to maximize the proceeds of the
IPO,51 or that MasterCard's use of a charitable foundation was moti-
vated by a combination of regulatory cost engineering and takeover
protection, rather than a desire to enhance the MasterCard brand.52
Of course, if the branding effect and transaction cost stories always
coincided, one might question the value of adding branding effects to
the analytical arsenal. But the occasional coincidence of transaction
cost economization and branding does not diminish the value of un-
derstanding Fleischer's branding effect. Indeed, Fleischer's criticism
of the MasterCard lawyers implies that a deeper understanding of
the branding effect would enhance the value that lawyers bring to
transactions.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1584.
48. Of course, the goal of branding is to stand out from the crowd. See FRANcIs J.
KELLY III & BARRY SILvERsTE1N, Ti BREAKAWAY BRAND: How GREAT BRANDs STAND
OuT 253 (2005) ("breakaway branding is at the heart of how you win in the world").
So, the idea that firms contribute to their brand image by doing what everyone else is
doing may seem more like a missed opportunity than a branding event.
49. Suchman, supra note 1, at 111.
50. Id. at 112.
51. See, e.g., Anita I. Anand, Is the Dutch Auction IPO a Good Idea? (Yale Law
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The "Branding Effect" of Contracts
Fleischer's work on the branding effect in contract structure is
part of a larger stream of scholarship that focuses on contract docu-
ments rather than on contract doctrine or dispute resolution. Empiri-
cal studies of contractual terms have become more common over the
past decade,53 but by and large, the questions asked by those studies
are limited to the transaction cost framework. Fleischer's work, on
the other hand, is part of a promising new avenue of research that
may yield new insights about why contracting parties use certain
deal structures and avoid others.
One of the important implications of asking new questions about
contract structure is that we are forced to reconsider the role of law-
yers as the primary drafters of contracts. In a world of transaction
cost economization, lawyers are "transaction cost engineers."54 As
Fleischer observes, the idea of transaction cost engineering may ex-
plain the central role of lawyers in contract drafting and relationship
formation: "In navigating clients through the regulatory thicket,
lawyers have an obvious comparative advantage over bankers and
managers."55 But if Fleischer is right about the branding effect of
deal structures, lawyers must be more than transaction cost engi-
neers; they must also coordinate their clients' efforts to enhance the
branding effect of corporate transactions.
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